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Abstract
We study 314 mergers and acquisitions (M&As) of European and American tech-
nology firms between 2004 and 2018. Using the standard event study methodology,
this paper analyzes the abnormal returns of bidders in the event window around the
M&A announcement date to investigate whether or not technology M&As create
value. Following the event study, we examine which factors influence the bidders’
abnormal returns. Even though previous literature has examined the determinants
of abnormal returns in industry-specific M&A transactions, the technology sector
has received less attention. Our findings show that the announcement effect of bid-
ders on average reduce their shareholder value. A possible explanation for the lack
of statistically significant positive abnormal returns is the competitiveness of mar-
kets for corporate control. Concerning specific determinants, our results show that
higher liquidity of the bidder firm on average leads to higher abnormal returns. We
also find strong evidence that the size of the transaction and the method of payment
influence abnormal returns of bidders. Moreover, we find that higher efficiency of
target firms generates higher abnormal returns for bidders. In conclusion, our re-
sults indicate that technology firms should aim to acquire small, efficient targets
using cash-only as the preferred method of payment.
Keywords: Event Study; Technology Industry; Mergers and Acquisitions; Share-
holder Value.
JEL Classifications: G14, G30, G34.
Definitions
AR Abnormal Returns
Bidder Acquiring Company
CAR Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Event M&A Announcement Date
GLS Generalized Least Squares
M&A Mergers and Acquisitions
OLS Ordinary Least Squares
R&D Research and Development
Target Acquired Company
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1 Introduction
There has been a dramatic increase in merger and acquisition (M&A) activity in
recent decades (Boone, Lie, and Liu, 2014), both in terms of volume and transac-
tion size. According to Bloomberg (2019), the aggregate value of M&A transactions
globally in 2018 was approximately $3.1 trillion, with Europe and U.S. accounting
for 80.4%. The importance of M&A transactions has been amplified by the ever-
changing market landscape, in which M&As are powerful tools employed by firms to
gain strategic advantages and increase shareholder value (Tamosˇiu¯niene˙ and Duk-
saite˙, 2009).
However, M&As are not inherently successful and therefore not guaranteed to
create value. Bidders face a difficult task of evaluating potential targets and we
consider it to be vital to understand the underlying determinants of value creation
in M&A transactions when making investment decisions.
The fact that some of the largest transactions in history have involved high-tech
firms (Lusyana and Sherif, 2016) is indicative of the increasing significance of the
technology sector. Furthermore, technology firms promote technological advance-
ments, scientific discoveries, and efficiency gains, making them innovative leaders in
today’s economy (Kohers and Kohers, 2001).
The bidders’ rationale for purchasing technology firms is the distinctive growth
opportunities and the efficiency potential from acquiring new technology rather than
developing it internally (Kohers and Kohers, 2001). Additionally, the disruptive
innovation potential of technology firms (Chitkara, Gloger, and McCaffrey, 2018)
makes them interesting targets for bidders. In contrast, technology firms are char-
acterized by an inherent valuation risk due to the uncertainty regarding future cash
flows and unproven developments. In addition, technology firms are coupled with
issues regarding ethics, especially concerning new applications of technology that
threats privacy or exploits consumers. Thus, the attractive growth prospects of
technology targets can come with a high price tag (Kohers and Kohers, 2000).
The high-growth, high-risk nature of technology-based industries raises impor-
tant questions about the value creation in technology M&As. In particular, the
drivers of value creation in takeovers of technology firms. The purpose of this paper
is to investigate M&As in the technology sector by examining transactions in Europe
and the U.S. between 2004 and 2018. We seek to explain which factors influence
abnormal returns of bidders in the event window around the announcement day of
the transaction. Even though previous literature has examined the determinants of
abnormal returns in industry-specific M&A transactions (e.g. Beitel, Schiereck, and
Wahrenburg, 2004), the technology sector has received less attention. Therefore, we
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believe this paper could fill an important area of the M&A literature.
Our intention is that the reported findings can serve as guidance in the decision-
making process of M&A transactions, in particular for the shareholders and man-
agement of the bidder firm. Furthermore, this paper contributes to a deeper under-
standing of value drivers in technology M&As.
2 Literature Review
The impact of M&A transactions on the value of the bidder, target, and combined
entity has been the focus of numerous studies in recent years. In this section, we
provide insight into the most relevant research made in the area by focusing on firstly
the general M&A research and subsequently the findings that have been made in
the context of technology M&A.
In general, the research on the impact of M&A on the abnormal returns is in-
conclusive. In terms of the hypothetical combined entity, various studies have shown
that the overall gain is slightly positive (e.g. Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001;
Bradley, Desai, and Kim, 1988). A number of studies have shown that the tar-
get captures most of the value created in M&A (e.g. Mandelker, 1974; Langetieg,
1978; Dodd, 1980; Malatesta, 1983; Dodd and Ruback, 1977). While the litera-
ture is consistent in the sense that M&A destroys value for the bidding firm (e.g.
Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001; Varaiya and Ferris, 1987; Bradley, Desai,
and Kim, 1988), a few studies have reported positive abnormal returns for bidders
when controlling for certain variables (e.g. Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004;
Sudarsanam, 1996; Halpern, 1973).
Although there has been extensive research in the context of technology M&A,
most research has focused on whether or not M&A creates value and not what
specifically determines value creation. Moreover, the results in the technology M&A
literature are inconclusive. In a study consisting of bidders acquiring high-tech tar-
gets in the U.S., Lusyana and Sherif (2016) found positive abnormal returns for
domestic bidders. In another key study, Kohers and Kohers (2000), who examined
which factors influenced shareholder wealth for high-tech firms between 1987 and
1996, also found positive abnormal returns for bidders. However, Porrini (2004)
showed negative abnormal returns for high-tech bidders in the event window. When
analyzing the combined entity, Kirchhoff and Schiereck (2011) showed slightly pos-
itive abnormal returns, while Parachuri, Nerkar, and Hambrick (2006) found that
the event did not create value.
Among the extensive research in the area, some studies have also examined
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the transaction characteristics. For example, Kirchhoff and Schiereck (2011), who
analyzed the key success factors in the pharmaceutical and biotechnology industry,
found that successful bidders have low R&D intensity, have outperformed their
benchmark during the estimation period, and take over targets with high cash flows.
Kohers and Kohers (2000) found that bidder returns were positive between 1993 and
1996 compared to the other time periods analyzed. The returns were also positive
if the target was private rather than public and the relative size of bidder to target
was large. Additionally, in a study of 787 transactions in the IT-industry between
1998 and 2011, Khansa (2015) found that small bidders were more successful than
large bidders. The author also found that cross-border transactions generated value
for bidders.
3 Theory
This section gives an overview of the most important theoretical background to this
paper. The first area concerns M&As in general, in particular the definition of an
M&A and the rationale for M&As. Next, we present four theories to analyze our
findings.
3.1 Definition of M&A
The term mergers and acquisitions (M&A) has various definitions and may imply a
range of transactions. In this paper, we adhere to Damodaran’s definition of M&As.
Damodaran (2008) defines a merger as a type of acquisition in which the boards
of directors of two firms agree to combine the firms into one entity. Damodaran
continues to define four types of acquisitions: consolidation, tender offer, purchase
of assets, and buyout. In a consolidation, a new firm is created, and both the bidder
and target firm own stock in the new entity. A tender offer occurs when the bidder
firm offers to buy the outstanding stock of the target at a specified price. A purchase
of assets refers to an agreement where one firm acquires the assets of another firm.
A buyout happens when the management, or a group of investors, buy out the firm
from a public market in order to make it private.
3.2 M&A Rationale
Trautwein (1990) sheds light on the rationale for M&As by explaining a number of
different motives. In particular, the author mentions the following motives: syner-
gies, target undervaluation, empire-building, and process outcomes.
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Synergies can be defined as the value created by combining two entities into
one and the creation of opportunities that would not be available if these entities
operated separately (Damodaran, 2005). Trautwein (1990) suggests three types
of synergies: operational synergies, financial synergies, and managerial synergies.
Operational synergies affect the operations of the firm and may include economies
of scale, pricing power, and growth potential, which could enable the firm to offer
new products and services (Damodaran, 2005; Trautwein, 1990). Financial synergies
may include increased debt capacity, tax benefits, and diversification. Managerial
synergies may be realized when the bidder’s managers possess abilities that benefit
the target firm’s performance.
Valuation theory encompasses the notion of target undervaluation. Trautwein
(1990) describes this as the bidder’s managers having better information about the
target’s value than the stock market or the managers having unique information
about possible synergies from combining the two entities.
In the empire-building theory, managers seek to maximize their own utility
under constraints put upon them by the market instead of maximizing firm value.
In this theory, growth maximization is regarded as one motive. Additionally, profit
and power motives may also be possible explanations for this type of behaviour.
The process theory states that M&A decisions are outcomes of processes influ-
enced by one or more of the following: individuals possessing limited information
processing capabilities which may lead to incomplete evaluations, political games
played between an organization’s sub-units and outsiders, and organizational rou-
tines.
3.3 Efficient Market Hypothesis
The efficient market hypothesis states that an ideally efficient capital market is one
in which prices always fully reflect available information. Fama (1970) describes
three different forms of market efficiency: weak form, semi-strong from, and strong
form. In the weak form prices only reflect historical information. In the semi-
strong form, prices reflect all the publicly available information and in the strong
form, prices reflect all the information, both public and private. The event study
represents a test of the semi-strong form (Fama, 1991) and gives a clear picture of
how prices adjust to new public information. Since we test for abnormal returns
during the event window, we would, if significant results are obtained, contradict
the theory of efficient markets (Fama, 1970).
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3.4 Capital Structure Theories
Myers (2001) suggests three main conditional capital structure theories: the tradeoff
theory, the free cash flow theory, and the pecking order theory.
The tradeoff theory postulates that firms choose their capital structure by bal-
ancing the tax advantages of debt against the cost of possible financial distress.
The free cash flow theory, put forth by Jensen (1986), says that firms generating
cash flow in excess of that required to fund its profitable investment opportunities are
more likely to engage in wasteful spending. Jensen argues that excess free cash flow
increases the conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. An implication
of the free cash flow theory is that firms with high levels of free cash flow are more
likely to initiate takeovers and investments that destroy value. According to this
theory, leverage increases the firm’s value despite the threat of financial distress
because it commits the firm to making future interest payments, thereby reducing
excess cash flows and agency costs.
The pecking order theory, put forth by Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf
(1984), establishes a relationship between the cost of financing and asymmetric in-
formation. The authors present three main sources of funding available to firms:
retained earnings, debt, and equity. In their paper, Myers and Majluf argue that
firms prefer to use retained earnings to finance projects. If external financing is
needed debt will be issued first and equity will only be used as a last resort. Re-
tained earnings have no adverse selection problems, whereas both debt and equity
are subject to adverse selection problems due to asymmetric information between
the managers of the firm and the outside investors. However, equity suffers from
more serious adverse selection problems and consequently has a larger risk premium
than debt. From the firm’s perspective, managers who believe that the equity is
undervalued will prefer to use retained earnings, or debt, rather than equity. In
contrast, equity will be issued only when managers believe that the equity is over-
valued. Therefore, outside investors will interpret the new equity issuance as a sign
of overvaluation and proceed to place a lower value to the new equity. Thus, the
theory implies that equity issuance will be followed by a negative stock reaction. In
the absence of other motives, the price drop upon announcement may be sufficient
to deter firms from issuing equity except as a last resort.
4 Methodology
This paper applies the event study methodology to investigate the value creation
in technology M&A. Besides the overall value implications, we particularly analyze
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the determinants of abnormal returns. To this end, we test several independent
variables that may explain the value creation following prior research.
4.1 Event Studies in General
The process of evaluating price changes surrounding a certain event was first dis-
cussed by Dolley (1933). The standard event study methodology was first imple-
mented by Ball and Brown (1968) and later Fama et al. (1969) in order to measure
the effects of actions and events on the value of a firm. Since these two studies, the
event study methodology has only changed marginally (Binder, 1998).
The usefulness of such a study comes from the fact that, given efficient markets,
the effects of an event will be reflected immediately in security prices (MacKinlay,
1997). Furthermore, short-term event studies are the most statistically reliable
methods to gauge the value implications of the announcement of M&As (Andrade,
Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001).
4.2 Event Study Design
Figure 1 illustrates the event study time line. The event of interest in this study is the
M&A announcement date, τ = 0. We define the estimation window as L1 = T1−T0.
The event window, L2 = T2 − T1, is the period in which abnormal returns are
calculated. Although our event under consideration is an announcement, which
occurs on a given date, it is typical to set the event window length, L2, larger
than one day (MacKinlay, 1997). Finally the post-event window, in which capital
markets’ reactions can be analyzed, is defined as L3 = T3 − T2.
Figure 1: Event Study Time Line
For the purposes of this paper, we set the baseline estimation window, L1, to
80 days prior to the event window. The baseline event window, L2, is 11 days
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immediately surrounding the M&A announcement, i.e. five days before to five days
after the announcement date, τ .
4.3 General Procedure
We rely our event study methodology on the market model-based approach sug-
gested by Brown and Warner (1985). Additionally, the methodology in this paper
follows the suggestions by MacKinlay (1997).
The market model is a statistical model, which relates the return of any given
security to the return of the market portfolio (MacKinlay, 1997). For any security i
the market model is
Ri,τ = αi + βiRm,τ + εi,τ (1)
E(εi,τ = 0) var(εi,τ ) = σ2εi
where Ri,τ and Rm,τ is the period-τ returns on security i and the market portfolio,
respectively, and εi,τ is the error term.
An OLS-regression model is applied to estimate the model parameters αi and
βi for each stock i. The parameters are estimated during the estimation window.
Expected returns, Rˆi,τ , are then calculated as follows
Rˆi,τ = αˆi + βˆiRm,τ . (2)
We proxy the market return, Rm,τ , for the daily closing values of either the STOXX
Europe 600 Technology Index or S&P 500 Information Technology Index depending
on whether the security is listed in Europe or in the U.S. Both indices are capital-
ization weighted and include firms involved in the technology sector.
Sample abnormal returns of a stock i in the event window, ÂRi,τ , are calculated
as the difference between the observed stock return, Ri,τ , and the expected stock
return, Rˆi,τ , in the event window
ÂRi,τ = Ri,τ − αˆi − βˆiRm,τ . (3)
Sample abnormal returns for period-τ are then averaged
ARτ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ÂRi,τ . (4)
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The conditional variance of abnormal returns, σ2(ÂRi,τ ), is calculated as follows
σ2(ÂRi,τ ) = σ2εi +
1
L1
[
1 + (Rm,τ − uˆm)
σˆ2m
]
(5)
where L1 is the length of the estimation window. The conditional variance has
two components; the error variance, σ2i , and an additional variance due to the
sampling error in αi and βi. The sampling error component, which is common for
all event studies, leads to serial correlation of the abnormal returns even though
the true disturbances are independent through time. However, as the length of the
estimation window L1 increases, the second term approaches zero and the sampling
error of the parameters becomes negligible (MacKinlay, 1997).
The sample cumulative abnormal returns, ̂CARi, for any interval (τ1, τ2) during
the event window, L2, are calculated as follows
ĈARi(τ1, τ2) =
τ2∑
τ=τ1
ÂRi,τ . (6)
Cumulative abnormal returns can be averaged using a similar approach to equation
(4) for any interval in the event window
CAR(τ1, τ2) =
τ2∑
τ=τ1
ARτ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ĈARi(τ1, τ2) (7)
where the variance of average cumulative abnormal returns are defined as
var(CAR(τ1, τ2)) =
τ2∑
τ=τ1
var(ARτ ). (8)
To test for significance, the null hypothesis is derived using the z-value that is
based on the sample variance of CAR divided by the square root of the number
of observations as a proxy for the unknown and unbiased standard deviation σε
(MacKinlay, 1997)
θ1 =
CAR(τ1, τ2)√
var(CAR(τ1, τ2))
∼ N(0, 1). (9)
If we are able to obtain significant results, we draw the conclusion that the event
has an impact on the distribution of returns.
Following the event study, an OLS-regression is applied to estimate the model
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parameters of the independent variables according to the basic model
CARi(−5; 5) = βi,0 +
n∑
j=1
βi,jFi,j + εi,j (10)
where CARi is the 11-day cumulative abnormal returns, βi,0 is the regression con-
stant, Fi,j the independent variable j ∈ {1, ..., n}, βi,j the coefficient of the inde-
pendent variable, εi,j the error term of the regression, for each stock, i, and n the
number of independent variables.
5 Data
In this section, we explain our sample selection process, discuss a few characteristics
of the sample, and provide insight into the choice of independent variables.
5.1 Sample
In selecting our sample, we follow the procedure suggested by MacKinlay (1997).
The sample is obtained from the Bloomberg M&A Database based on our chosen
selection criteria. We require that (i) the transactions were announced between 1
January 2004 and 31 December 2019, (ii) both the target and bidder operate in
the technology sector according to the Bloomberg Industry Classification System
(BICS), (iii) the deal status is completed, (iv) the payment includes cash, stock
or a mix of the two, (v) both the target and bidder are publicly traded and have
available information on Bloomberg, (vi) both the target and bidder operate in
Europe and/or the U.S., and (vii) there is an exclusive bidder of the target firm.
This selection process leads to 314 transactions.
The stock price data is obtained from Bloomberg Terminal using the last traded
price for each trading day. We use daily intervals based on the findings of Morse
(1984). He found that using daily stock returns produce a more powerful statistic for
abnormal returns. According to the author, monthly data is only preferable when
there is uncertainty regarding the announcement date. However, this uncertainty is
not present in our sample.
Although country-specific differences are outside the scope of this paper, we pro-
vide an overview of the geographical distribution of our sample in Table 1. As seen
in the table, our sample is clearly dominated by U.S. firms. Of the total 314 trans-
actions, U.S. firms are targets in 197 transactions and bidders in 213 transactions.
Among the European countries, United Kingdom, France, and Germany represent
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the countries with the most frequent bidders. Most European targets come from the
United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Sweden. Apart from the U.S., both United
Kingdom and France have the most frequent domestic transactions.
Target
Country
Bidder Country
AT BE CH DE ES FI FR GB GR IS NL NO PL SE US Total
AT 1 1
BE 1 2 1 4
CH 2 1 3
DE 2 4 1 1 1 1 1 11
DK 1 1
FI 1 1
FR 2 1 14 4 5 26
GB 1 1 1 11 1 21 36
GR 1 1
HU 2 2
IE 2 2
LU 1 1
MT 1 1
NL 2 2
NO 1 1 1 2 2 7
PL 1 6 7
SE 1 5 5 11
US 1 7 6 7 2 1 173 197
Total 3 2 2 17 1 2 24 27 1 1 6 3 7 5 213 314
AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, CH = Switzerland, DE = Germany, ES = Spain, FI = Finland, FR = France, GB
= United Kingdom, GR = Greece, HU = Hungary, IE = Ireland, IS = Iceland, LU = Luxembourg, MT = Malta,
NL = Netherlands, NO = Norway, PL = Poland, SE = Sweden, US = United States.
Table 1: Geographical Distribution of Sample
5.2 Independent Variables
In our analysis, we use two subcategories of variables, namely: transaction-specific
and firm-specific variables. Table 2 presents an overview of the selected variables.
One of the variables used in our analysis is the geographical focus of the transac-
tion. In our study, we use a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for cross-border
transactions and 0 for domestic transactions. The geographical focus of a transac-
tion could imply imperfections and costs in product- or factor markets, differences
in regulations or government policies, and asymmetric information in capital mar-
kets (Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991). For example, Bris, Brisley, and Cabolis (2008)
found that bidders benefited when acquiring target firms in countries with worse
shareholder protection and accounting standards (see also Bris and Cabolis, 2008).
Moreover, the abnormal returns and volume of cross-border transactions may be
affected by cultural differences (Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi, 2012). However,
neither Lowinski, Schiereck, and Thomas (2004) nor Higgins and Rodriguez (2006)
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could identify any significant evidence for geographical focus as a source of value
creation.
Another variable considered in our study is the method of payment used in the
transaction. To examine this, we use a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for
stock-included payments and 0 for cash-only transaction. The implications of the
payment method in M&A transactions have been the focus of numerous studies
(e.g. Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford, 2001; Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Travlos,
1987). Myers and Majluf (1984) concluded that the decision to issue shares to
finance a transaction carries negative information that the bidder firm is overvalued.
Thus, stock-included payments should yield lower abnormal returns than cash-only
payments, all else equal (see also Hansen, 1987). In conformity, Andrade, Mitchell,
and Stafford (2001) found negative abnormal returns if the bidder used at least
some stock to finance the acquisition. Furthermore, Kirchhoff and Schiereck (2011,
p.40) argued that cash payments are “favorable to the targets, since the acquired
firm would have to bear the price risk if paid by stocks”. Given prior evidence,
stock-included payments might have a negative announcement effect.
We also consider the transaction size a relevant variable. In contrast to other
studies, this paper uses the logarithm of the total reported transaction value rather
than the absolute value. The reason is that our sample is biased towards small
transactions and using the logarithm can transform the distribution toward normal-
ity (Feng et al., 2004). Loderer and Martin (1990) suggested that large transactions
tended to be value destroying to bidders because they overpaid. This could be ex-
plained by overconfident managers (see Roll, 1986) or due to the inherent difficulties
valuing high-tech firms (Kohers and Kohers, 2000). In conformity, Khansa (2015)
found a significant negative relationship between the value of the transaction and
abnormal returns to the bidder. In another study, Alexandriis et al. (2011) found
that there is a negative correlation between the premia paid and transaction size.
Nonetheless, larger transactions still destroyed value for bidders and the uncertainty
regarding returns increased as a consequence of the transaction, suggesting that in-
vestors view large acquisitions as more risky projects.
An alternative measure of transaction size is the relative size of the bidder and
the target. To measure this, we use the relative market value of bidder to target. In
the case of technology firms, it is easier to integrate human capital and intellectual
property of the bidder and the target in the combined entity when the relative size
is larger (Masulis, Wang, and Xie, 2007). Given prior evidence, we expect smaller
targets relative to bidders to create higher returns for bidder shareholders.
In accordance with Kirchhoff and Schiereck (2011), we test to see if the sales
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performance of the bidder or target affects bidders’ returns in the technology indus-
try. As the authors did, we examine the sales growth of targets and bidders, as well
as their respective sales to asset ratios. We expect a prominent sales performance
of the target as a sign of innovation capacity, which may complement the bidders
own sales efforts and thus generate value to the bidding shareholders.
R&D investments are central in the technology industry and often closely tied
to the sales performance of the firm. In line with prior studies (e.g. Higgins and
Rodrigeuz, 2006; Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu, 2007; Kirchhoff and Schiereck,
2011), we measure R&D intensity as R&D expenditures relative to sales, both for
the target and bidder. R&D investments are imperative in order to develop new
products and consequently create future cash flow streams. Furthermore, the faster
a firm can produce new products and bring them to market, the more likely it is
to capture first-mover advantages such as reputation effects and market preemption
(Deeds and Hill, 1996). R&D is therefore expected to be an important driver for
M&A because it allows bidders with weaker research capacity to acquire targets with
high R&D investments and thus close the gap (Kirchhoff and Schiereck, 2011; James,
2002; Deeds and Hill, 1996). However, firms with higher R&D intensity are more
likely to engage in R&D outsourcing acquisitions (Higgins and Rodriguez, 2006).
Additionally, bidders with low R&D intensity face greater difficulty in attracting
good targets than firms with high R&D capacity (Sorescu, Chandy, and Prabhu,
2007).
Another firm-specific variable considered in our study is liquidity. According
to Myers and Majluf (1984), a firm always increases its value through M&A when
one firm’s surplus slack fully covers the other firm’s deficiency. This suggests that
illiquid bidders acquiring targets with high financial slack generates higher abnormal
return, and vice versa. However, firms with financial slack are also more likely to
undergo value destroying acquisitions (Jensen, 1986). In our study, we measure
liquidity for both target and bidder by calculating free cash flow to sales.
We also examine the growth focus of the transaction by analyzing the total
growth of the target’s assets prior to the transaction. The asset growth measures
whether the target firm is in a positive or negative growing trend (Kirchhoff and
Schiereck, 2011) and a positive trend may encourage the bidder’s growth (Beitel,
Schiereck, and Wahrenburg, 2004).
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Name of Variable Definition
Panel A: Transaction-Specific
Geographical Focus Binary dummy variable; 1 for cross-border transactions
and 0 for domestic transactions
Method of Payment Binary dummy variable; 1 for stock-included payments
and 0 for cash-only payments
Transaction Size Logarithm of the total reported transaction value of the
target firm
Panel B: Firm-Specific
Growth Focus Growth of target’s total assetsa
Bidder Liquidity Bidder free cash flowb relative to bidder salesb
Target Liquidity Target free cash flowb relative to target salesb
Bidder R&D Intensity Bidder R&D expendituresb relative to bidder salesb
Target R&D Intensity Target R&D expendituresb relative to target salesb
Relative Market Value Market value of the targetb relative to market value of
the bidderb
Bidder Sales Growth Growth of bidder’s salesa
Target Sales Growth Growth of target’s salesa
Bidder Sales to Assets Bidder salesb relative to bidder total assetsb
Target Sales to Assets Target salesb relative to target total assetsb
a31.12.t− 1 divided by 31.12.t− 2, where t is the announcement year; bPer December of the year prior to the
announcement year, t− 1, where t is the announcement year.
Table 2: Definition of Variables
Table 3 presents summary statistics of the independent variables. The average
transaction size is €920.5 million, but evidently from the high standard deviation
and the difference between the median and the average, the distribution of trans-
action size is skewed. Interestingly, the average target invests more in R&D than
the average bidder, indicating that bidders tend to acquire targets with higher R&D
intensity, in line with previous literature (James, 2002; Deeds and Hill, 1996). Bid-
ders are clearly more liquid than targets in the average transaction. It can also be
seen from the average and median figures in Table 3 that bidders are more efficient
in terms of sales to assets but targets grow marginally faster.
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Variable N Average Median Std. dev. Min Max
Panel A: Transaction-Specific
Dummy: Geographical Focus 314 - - - - -
Dummy: Method of Payment 314 - - - - -
Transaction Sizea 314 920.52 204.05 2,070.78 0.08 15,494.02
Panel B: Firm-Specific
Growth Focus 309 12.06% 4.88% 36.78% (72.94%) 292.14%
Bidder Liquidity 309 10.72% 11.32% 21.80% (270.45%) 41.19%
Target Liquidity 308 3.43% 4.65% 17.24% (106.41%) 42.26%
Bidder R&D Intensity 301 12.64% 12.13% 10.29% 0.00% 66.27%
Target R&D Intensity 275 16.59% 15.56% 13.50% 0.00% 99.50%
Relative Market Value 312 19.77% 8.52% 26.42% 0.03% 245.31%
Bidder Sales Growth 306 12.98% 7.73% 35.90% (68.87%) 294.64%
Target Sales Growth 309 13.40% 4.43% 69.57% (90.00%) 1,102.55%
Bidder Sales to Assets 308 81.05% 75.40% 37.55% 14.85% 261.34%
Target Sales to Assets 310 26.14% 9.25% 50.01% 0.0% 552.38%
aValues in million euros
Table 3: Characteristics of Independent Variables
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5.3 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 shows a breakdown of the transactions over time. The number of transac-
tions increased during the first years in our sample, peaking in 2005 at 38 followed
by a sharp decline in 2009, possibly as a result of the financial crisis of 2008. Inter-
estingly, almost 70% of the transactions were announced in the first half of the time
period, between 2004 and 2011. Moreover, approximately 30% of the transactions
were announced in the period surrounding the financial crisis. Despite the down-
ward trend in M&A activity, the transaction size paints a different picture. The
total reported transaction value has increased since the turn of the decade, with two
notable exceptions: 2013 and 2017. This indicates that fewer but larger transac-
tions have been announced in recent years. Additionally, the portion of transactions
financed by cash-only averaged 73.7% per year. Our sample shows that the portion
of cash-only transactions increased steeply in the wake of the financial crisis and
up until 2014. The subsequent decrease could be linked to the lower interest rate
climate in recent years, making stock-financed transactions more attractive from the
point of view of the bidding firm.
Year Transaction Sizea Transaction Count Cash-Only Transactions
2004 2,751.01 19 63.16%
2005 15,712.97 38 50.00%
2006 13,166.60 28 64.29%
2007 21,219.19 34 73.53%
2008 12,161.38 32 71.88%
2009 19,636.97 22 72.73%
2010 14,434.20 21 95.24%
2011 24,916.95 17 88.24%
2012 10,292.27 15 86.67%
2013 1,705.09 13 84.62%
2014 18,334.44 17 88.20%
2015 64,595.63 22 63.64%
2016 25,413.36 13 61.54%
2017 2.362.30 8 75.00%
2018 42,339.73 15 66.67%
Total 289,042.09 314
Average 19,269.47 21 73.69%
Median 15,712.97 19 72.73%
aValues in million euros.
Table 4: Sample Time Trend
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Table 5 provides descriptive statistics of key figures used in our study. As seen
in the table, the average bidder is 25 times larger than the average target in terms
of asset size and sales. Turning to free cash flow, the bidders generate on average
38 times that of targets. Overall, these results indicate that the average target is
remarkably smaller than the average bidder.
Characteristicsa Bidders Targets Ratio Target/Bidder
Total Assetsb
N 311 311
Average 12,127.55 500.37 4.13%
Standard Deviation 23,800.44 1,342.16
Min. 2.76 0.78
Max. 101,069.00 13,182.47
Free Cash Flowb
N 312 309
Average 1373.26 35.66 2.60%
Standard Deviation 2951.83 123.90
Min. -489.51 -146.55
Max. 23873.71 1103.44
Total Salesb
N 309 313
Average 9,762.70 399.34 4.09%
Standard Deviation 20,395.83 1,202.14
Min. 0.41 0.08
Max. 93,787.12 16,170.57
R&D Expendituresb
N 304 276
Average 736.58 44.47 6.04%
Standard Deviation 1,366.40 108.08
Min. 0.00 0.00
Max. 8,685.77 1,249.862
aValues in million euros, unless stated otherwise; bPer December of the year prior to the announcement year, t− 1,
where t is the announcement year.
Table 5: Key Figures of Identified Transactions
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6 Results
In this section, we provide an overview of the average stock price reactions following
the M&A announcement. This allows us to answer whether or not M&A transactions
create value for the bidders. Secondly, we report which factors best determine the
cumulative abnormal return of bidders.
6.1 Overall Stock Price Reactions
We report the average abnormal returns for each day for our significant event win-
dows in Table 6. Four of the ten days report positive abnormal return, albeit
statistically insignificant. We find negative significant average abnormal returns for
three days in the event window, i.e. three days prior to the event, one day and five
days after the event. These results further support our selection of baseline event
window, [−5; 5].
The stock price reaction around the M&A announcement date of bidders with a
fixed estimation window of 80 days and varying event windows is summarized in Ta-
ble 7. We find only two event window intervals ([-5;5] and [0;5]) that are statistically
significant at the 10% significance level. Our findings show that on average there
is no strong significant M&A announcement effect, although we might have cross-
sectional significance. The lack of statistically significant positive abnormal stock
returns could be a result of competitive markets for corporate control. Competition
among bidding firms leads to a more efficient price discovery process, which results
in a price of the target firm that reflects the benefits the bidder obtain from the
acquisition (Travlos, 1987). Additionally, the fact that approximately 30% of the
transactions in the sample were announced in the period surrounding the financial
crisis, i.e. between 2007 and 2009, could be a contributing factor to the finding of
negative abnormal returns.
The average stock price reaction of bidders show value decreases following the
M&A transaction in all intervals. In addition, the value decreases seems to be nega-
tively correlated with the length of the event window. However, on average, almost
50% of the observations report positive reactions following the transaction. This
finding is largely consistent with previous literature (see Kirchhoff and Schiereck,
2011).
17
Days to event AAR (%) z-Value Positive (%)
−5 -0.1201 0.983 50.00
−4 0.0714 0.138 49.36
−3 -0.1606* -1.881 44.91
−2 -0.1885 -0.892 47.77
−1 0.0997 0.765 46.18
0 -0.2812 -1.483 48.41
1 -0.1000* -1.764 47.77
2 0.0221 -1.022 45.86
3 -0.1681 -0.401 46.82
4 -0.1722 0.382 41.40
5 -0.1372* -1.978 49.36
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
Table 6: Average AR in the Event Window
Interval CAR (%) Positive Negative t-Test p-Value
[−20; 20] -1.3106 143 171 -1.36 0.173
[−10; 10] -0.5161 150 164 -0.71 0.476
[−5; 5] -0.8944* 150 164 -1.73 0.085
[−2; 2] -0.4479 147 167 -1.13 0.261
[−1; 1] -0.2815 144 170 -0.76 0.445
[0] -0.2812 147 167 -0.76 0.446
[0; 1] -0.3812 151 163 -1.12 0.264
[0; 5] -0.8366* 147 167 -1.92 0.056
[0; 10] -0.3860 158 156 -0.69 0.489
[0; 20] -0.8912 147 167 -1.24 0.217
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
Table 7: Average CAR of Bidder with 80-day Estimation Window
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6.2 Determinants of Bidders’ Abnormal Returns
6.2.1 Univariate Regressions
After analyzing the correlation matrix (see Table A.3), we conclude that some of our
independent variables are significantly correlated with each other. Consequently, we
calculate the variance inflation factor (VIF) in our initial regression, which indicate
that our main model suffers from multicollinearity (see Table A.5).
To indirectly account for multicollinearity, we implemented an univariate anal-
ysis for each variable in accordance with Kirchhoff and Schiereck (2011). The uni-
variate analysis is conducted by comparing and testing the tails of the sample for
statistical significance. In our analysis, we use the top and bottom 40 cases. Our
findings are that Method of Payment, Transaction Size, Bidder Liquidity, Bidder
R&D Intensity, and Target Sales to Assets are all independently significant (see
Table B.2)
The univariate analysis further facilitated the selection process of relevant vari-
ables in the multiple regression. The variables with significant effect in the univariate
regressions have been inserted into the multiple regression.
6.2.2 Multiple Regression
In this section, we use the significant independent variables from the univariate
regressions to run a multiple regression for a complete perspective on determinants
of abnormal returns in technology M&A. The multiple regression analysis measures
the joint effect of our set of variables on the cumulative abnormal returns of the
bidders as well as the interdependence between them.
Table 8 presents an overview of the univariate regressions of our significant
variables on the entire sample as well as the multiple regression. In the multiple
regression, five variables explain 6.2% of the bidders’ cumulative abnormal returns
in the event window around the M&A announcement. Two variables are significant
at 5% significance level and two variables are significant at 10% significance level.
The multiple regression suggests that the stock market reaction of the bidder is
positively influenced by cash-only payments rather than stock included payments,
smaller transaction size, higher target sales to assets, and higher bidder liquidity.
However, bidder R&D intensity is not statistically significant in the multiple regres-
sion but in the univariate regression.
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Multiple Regression [−5; 5]
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant 0.0016(0.0051)
0.0049
(0.0173)
-0.0140**
(0.0061)
0.0014
(0.0082)
-0.0110**
(0.0093)
0.0246
(0.0209)
Method of Payment -0.0373***(0.0134)
-0.0360**
(0.0162)
Transaction Size -0.0037(0.0030)
-0.0054*
(0.0032)
Bidder Liquidity -0.0664(0.0221)
0.0785*
(0.0460)
Bidder R&D Intensity -0.3795**(0.0512)
-0.0702
(0.0538)
Target Sales to Assets 0.0101(0.0050)
0.0258**
(0.0124)
N 314 314 309 301 310 267
F -Stat 2.98**
Adj. R2 0.0614 0.0009 0.0397 0.0371 0.0080 0.0624
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
Values within parentheses are robust standard errors.
Table 8: Multiple Regression
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7 Robustness Check
The initial robustness method implemented in this study is the use of different event
and estimation windows. As mentioned in Section 4, our baseline estimation window
is the period 80 days prior to the event window and our baseline event window is
the 11-day ([-5;5]) window immediately surrounding the event. In order to test the
robustness of our baseline case, we tested longer estimation windows to investigate
whether this improves the accuracy of our normal returns. However, this did not
change our results except the magnitude of cumulative average abnormal returns.
In addition, we both expanded and shortened the event window. The use of a
longer event window could potentially include confounding events and increases the
exposure to market noise (Lamdin, 2001). Moreover, shortening the event window
could increase the power of our test (MacKinlay, 1997). However, we did not find
any different results by changing the event window.
The second robustness check derives from our analysis of the sample charac-
teristics. In an attempt to control for specific tendencies of the sample, we set up
three new models containing our significant independent variables from the univari-
ate analysis with an additional control variable (see Table A.4). Firstly, since a
majority of the transactions were announced in the first half of our time period, i.e.
between 2004 and 2011, we include a time dummy. The time dummy is negatively
significant at 1%, which indicates that transactions in the first half of the period
report on average lower abnormal returns than those in the subsequent period. A
possible explanation is effects of the financial crisis. Secondly, as our sample is dom-
inated by U.S. firms (see Table 1), we include a U.S. dummy. Lastly, we identify
that only 222 unique bidders acquired 314 targets in our sample, which indicates
that a few bidders are more active than others. To control for this we include an
active dummy variable. Neither the U.S. dummy nor the active bidder dummy are
statistically significant. Additionally, we include two models with interaction terms,
one model with interactions between method of payment and a set of dummy vari-
ables and one model with interactions between transaction size and a set of dummy
variables. No model changed our initial results, which we interpret as a sign of
robustness to the above sample characteristics.
To test for multicollinearity in our models, VIF-tests are carried out on both
the total variables and the variables used in the main regression. As evident from
Table A.5, our initial multiple regression model suffered from multicollinearity. This
issue is supported by the correlations between the variables (See Table A.3). The
problem is presumably due to the fact that many variables have the same numerator
or denominator. For example, the sales, liquidity, and R&D variables are all based
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on the firm’s total sales. However, after conducting our variable selection process,
the results are remarkably better.
Finally we discuss a few possible limitations of our study. To start, reoccurring
bidders in the sample could lead to certain degree of correlation between residuals.
In this case, OLS-regressions might not be sufficient. To account for issues such as
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, GLS-regressions can be applied instead. Ad-
ditionally, OLS-regressions are sensitive to the presence of outliers and high leverage
data points (Sorokina, Booth, and Thornton, 2013). As Brown and Warner (1985)
demonstrate, daily stock returns are characterized by non-normality, which results
in the presence of outliers. However, it is not clear to what degree this issue af-
fects the conclusions drawn by event study research. There are robust regression
methods for effective treatment of outliers, e.g. the weighted regression approach,
or M-estimation, suggested by Huber (1973) or the extension, MM-estimation, put
forth by Yohai (1987). The use of these methods is not in the scope of this paper
and we recognize the limitations it puts on our conclusions.
8 Conclusion
This study was designed to analyze the determinants of bidders’ abnormal returns in
technology M&A in the hope of contributing to a deeper understanding of the drivers
of value creation. Our intention is that the reported findings can serve as guidance in
the decision-making process for shareholders and managers. Our results showed that
stock markets were pessimistic about technology M&As. The announcement effect
of bidders on average reduce their shareholder value, albeit statistically significant
in only two event window intervals. The significant abnormal returns contradict the
semi-strong form of the efficient market hypothesis. This finding is largely consistent
with prior literature on the value implication of M&A transactions on the bidder
firm. A possible explanation for the lack of statistically significant positive abnormal
returns is the competitiveness of markets for corporate control.
With regards to specific determinants of bidders’ abnormal returns, our results
indicate several interesting findings. We found a positive relationship between bid-
der liquidity and abnormal returns. This result is in contrast with Jensen’s (1986)
free cash flow hypothesis, which says that excess cash flow increases the likelihood
of managers initiating takeovers that destroy value. This contradictory result could
be attributed to cash-rich bidders acquiring targets with high growth opportunities,
as demonstrated by previous literature. We also found that high sales to asset ra-
tio of target firms is a source of abnormal returns, which indicates that the stock
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market tends to be more enthusiastic about the expected benefits of acquiring ef-
ficient targets. Moreover, we found strong evidence that transactions financed by
cash-only, rather than stock-included payments, generate higher abnormal returns,
implying that stock markets strongly consider the method of payment when evalu-
ating M&As. This result is in line with Myers’ and Majluf’s (1984) pecking order
theory, which states that new stock issuance is a sign of firm overvaluation and thus
is followed by a value decline upon announcement. Concerning the transaction size,
we found that larger transactions on average generated lower abnormal returns than
smaller transactions. We interpret this result as an indicator of the difficulty of
post-merger integration and the uncertainty regarding the realization of synergies
in larger transactions. Additionally, this result suggests that stock markets may
perceive managers as overconfident and overestimate their abilities to realize man-
agerial synergies. Due to the inherent risk in technology industries, it is also possible
that stock markets consider large transactions in this industry risky projects and
punish firms accordingly. Lastly, we identified that the effect of R&D investments
in technology M&As have no statistically significant impact on abnormal returns, in
contrast with our initial expectations. Our interpretation is that the stock markets
do not rely on R&D investments as a proxy for the innovation potential of target
firms.
We obtained our results from a generalized empirical study. Being limited to
this, our study does not evaluate the causes behind our findings. Further research is
therefore recommended in order to understand the different mechanics behind the
drivers of abnormal returns in technology M&A. In particular, we believe that it
would be interesting to gauge the innovation potential of target firms in light of ab-
normal returns of bidders. For instance, by studying the patent portfolios of targets.
In addition, as technology firms are couple with ethical issues, it would be interesting
to investigate the effects of unethical practices on technology M&A performance. A
case study could be useful in order to evaluate both of these issues and thus obtain
more detailed results and further develop more concrete recommendations regarding
decision-making in technology M&A transactions.
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Appendices
Appendix A Robustness
Interval CAR (%) Positive Negative t-Test p-Value
[−20; 20] -1.0205 136 178 -1.01 0.314
[−10; 10] -0.3418 153 161 -0.48 0.630
[−5; 5] -0.8562* 151 163 1.67 0.096
[−2; 2] -0.4794 149 165 -1.21 0.228
[−1; 1] -0.2871 143 171 -0.78 0.434
[0] -0.3449 151 163 -1.19 0.237
[0; 1] -0.3762 150 164 -1.10 0.271
[0; 5] -0.8057* 146 168 -1.85 0.066
[0; 10] -0.3476 155 159 -0.63 0.530
[0; 20] -0.9061 146 168 -1.29 0.199
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
Table A.1: Average CAR of Bidder with 100-day Estimation Window
Interval CAR (%) Positive Negative t-Test p-Value
[−20; 20] -1.6436 144 170 -1.39 0.166
[−10; 10] -0.7752 149 165 -0.95 0.343
[−5; 5] -0.8427* 148 166 -1.70 0.091
[−2; 2] -0.4512 146 168 -1.14 0.254
[−1; 1] -0.2812 147 167 -0.76 0.446
[0] -0.3436 150 164 -1.18 0.240
[0; 1] -0.3717 150 164 -1.09 0.277
[0; 5] -0.7726* 149 165 -1.81 0.072
[0; 10] -0.2937 155 159 -0.53 0.597
[0; 20] -0.8431 145 169 -1.21 0.228
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
Table A.2: Average CAR of Bidder with 120-day Estimation Window
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Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 1.0000
2 Geographical Focus 0.0322 1.0000
3 Method of Payment -0.0924 -0.1527* 1.0000
4 Transaction Size -0.1080 -0.0797 0.0067 1.0000
5 Growth Focus 0.0113 -0.1098 0.0458 0.0543 1.0000
6 Bidder Liquidity 0.0118 0.0408 -0.2323* 0.2630* 0.0890 1.0000
7 Target Liquidity -0.1048 0.0320 -0.0633 0.2617* 0.1434* 0.0680 1.0000
8 Bidder R&D Intensity -0.1034 -0.0303 0.0244 -0.0681 -0.0447 -0.1287* -0.1164* 1.0000
9 Target R&D Intensity 0.0001 -0.1323* -0.0102 0.0210 -0.1585* 0.1602* -0.4097* 0.4832* 1.0000
10 Relative Market Value 0.0306 -0.0537 0.5131* 0.0700 -0.0299 -0.1310* 0.0638 -0.0024 -0.0857 1.0000
11 Bidder Sales Growth 0.0353 0.0018 0.0729 0.0082 0.1400* -0.1508* 0.0027 -0.0749 0.0776 -0.0019 1.0000
12 Target Sales Growth 0.0543 -0.0656 0.0458 0.0937 0.2385* 0.0779 -0.2669* -0.0382 -0.1092 0.0401 0.2613* 1.0000
13 Bidder Sales to Assets 0.0612 -0.0021 0.0665 -0.1103 0.0225 -0.0712 0.0005 -0.361* -0.3042* 0.1028 -0.0713 -0.0432 1.0000
14 Target Sales to Assets 0.0644 -0.1114* 0.3746* -0.1593* 0.0035 -0.1544* -0.0221 0.1321* -0.0601 0.4671* -0.0358 0.0999 0.2900* 1.0000
* Significant at the 5% level.
Table A.3: Pearson Correlation Matrix
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Multiple Regressions with New Variables [−5; 5]
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant 0.0545**
(0.0221)
0.0244
(0.0165)
0.0248
(0.0163)
0.0326
(0.0171)
0.0054
(0.0183)
0.0055
(0.0231)
Method of Payment -0.0357**
(0.0160)
-0.0359**
(0.0129)
-0.0386**
(0.0130)
-0.0253
(0.0310)
0.0086
(0.0528)
0.0389
(0.0544)
Transaction Size -0.0071**
(0.0031)
-0.0055
(0.0028)
-0.0046
(0.0028)
-0.0698**
(0.0028)
-0.0005
(0.0032)
0.0022
(0.0039)
Bidder Liquidity 0.0802*
(0.0464)
0.0785*
(0.0386)
0.0817*
(0.0386)
0.0866*
(0.0383)
0.0827*
(0.0495)
0.1026*
(0.0523)
Bidder R&D Intensity -0.0790
(0.0538)
-0.0715
(0.0529)
0.0763
(0.0506)
-0.0833
(0.0513)
-0.0580
(0.0539)
-0.1122*
(0.0610)
Target Sales to Assets 0.0263**
(0.0120)
0.0259**
(0.0123)
0.0250**
(0.0123)
0.0290**
(0.0122)
0.0263**
(0.0133)
0.0335***
(0.0126)
Time Dummya -0.0288***
(0.0108)
-0.0149
(0.0117)
U.S. Dummyb 0.0010
(0.0124)
0.0538
(0.0341)
Active Bidder Dummyc -0.0165
(0.0142)
-0.0614
(0.0574)
Method of Payment x Time Dummy -0.0413
(0.0235)
-0.0429
(0.0315)
Method of Payment x U.S. Dummy 0.0135
(0.0235)
0.0414
(0.0353)
Method of Payment x Geographical Focus 0.0501*
(0.0263)
0.0541*
(0.0316)
Transaction Size x Method of Payment -0.091
(0.0091)
-0.0156*
(0.0093)
Transaction Size x U.S. Dummy -0.0012
(0.0020)
-0.0112*
(0.0059)
Transaction Size x Active Bidder Dummy -0.0023
(0.0017)
0.0073
(0.0085)
N 299 299 299 299 299 299
F -Stat. 4.12*** 3.24*** 3.48*** 3.63*** 2.06* 2.58**
Adj. R2 0.0630 0.0431 0.0475 0.0660 0.0491 0.0956
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
a1 for transactions between 2004 and 2012 and 0 for transactions between 2013 and 2018; b1 for U.S. bidder,
otherwise 0; c1 for bidders with 5 or more acquisitions in the sample, otherwise 0.
Values within parentheses are robust standard errors.
Table A.4: Multiple Regressions with New Variables
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All Variables Main model
Variable VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF
Geographical Focus 1.11 0.9043
Method of Payment 1.63 0.6148 1.26 0.7915
Transaction Size 1.45 0.6905 1.14 0.8804
Growth Focus 2.23 0.4485
Bidder Liquidity 1.67 0.5981 1.25 0.8005
Target Liquidity 1.46 0.6859
Bidder R&D Intensity 1.94 0.5156 1.03 0.9706
Target R&D Intensity 1.95 0.5127
Relative Market Value 2.21 0.4535
Bidder Sales Growth 1.28 0.7793
Target Sales Growth 2.49 0.4009
Bidder Sales to Assets 1.52 0.6599
Target Sales to Assets 8.64 0.1158 1.29 0.7780
Table A.5: Variance Inflation Factors
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Multiple Regression of All Independent Variables [−5; 5]
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Error t-value p-value
Constant 0.0327 0.0332 0.98 0.326
Geographical Focus 0.0070 0.0123 0.57 0.568
Method of Payment -0.0515*** 0.0197 -2.62 0.009
Transaction Size -0.0057 0.0041 -1.38 0.170
Growth Focus 0.0034 0.0271 0.12 0.901
Bidder Liquidity 0.0552 0.0586 0.94 0.346
Target Liquidity -0.0436 0.0323 -1.35 0.179
Bidder R&D Intensity -0.1663** 0.0773 -2.15 0.032
Target R&D Intensity 0.0884 0.0566 1.56 0.120
Relative Market Value 0.0476 0.0336 1.42 0.158
Bidder Sales Growth 0.0027 0.0280 0.10 0.924
Target Sales Growth 0.0128 0.0280 0.46 0.648
Bidder Sales to Assets -0.0175 0.0247 -0.71 0.480
Target Sales to Assets 0.0271* 0.0154 1.76 0.080
N 263
F -Stat. 2.17**
Adj. R2 0.0647
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
Table B.1: Multiple Regression of All Independent Variables
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Univariate Regressions of Top and Bottom Cases [−5; 5]
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Constant 0.0220
(0.0230)
0.0201
(0.0204)
-0.0468*
(0.0241)
0.0373
(0.0321)
-0.0379*
(0.0217)
Method of Payment -0.0906**
(0.0370)
Transaction Size -0.0078*
(0.0049)
Bidder Liquidity 0.3274*
(0.1670)
Bidder R&D Intensity -0.3795**
(0.1675)
Target Sales to Assets 0.0509*
(0.0268)
N 80 80 78 74 79
Adj. R2 0.0614 0.0009 0.0397 0.0371 0.0080
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level.
Values within parentheses are robust standard errors.
Table B.2: Univariate Regressions
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